Social interaction, languaging and the operational conditions for the emergence of observing by Vincenzo Raimondi
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 14 August 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00899
Social interaction, languaging and the operational
conditions for the emergence of observing
Vincenzo Raimondi*
Linguistique Anthropologique et Sociolinguistique – Institut Marcel Mauss, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France
Edited by:
Hanne De Jaegher, University of the
Basque Country, Spain
Reviewed by:
John Joseph McGraw, TESIS
Network, Denmark
Talbot J. Taylor, College of William and
Mary, USA
*Correspondence:
Vincenzo Raimondi, Linguistique
Anthropologique et Sociolinguistique
– Institut Marcel Mauss, École des
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales,
190-198 Avenue de France,
75013 Paris, France
e-mail: vincenzoraimondi@
hotmail.com
In order to adequately understand the foundations of human social interaction, we need
to provide an explanation of our speciﬁc mode of living based on linguistic activity and
the cultural practices with which it is interwoven. To this end, we need to make explicit
the constitutive conditions for the emergence of the phenomena which relate to language
and joint activity starting from their operational-relational matrix. The approach presented
here challenges the inadequacy of mentalist models to explain the relation between
language and interaction. Recent empirical studies concerning joint attention and language
acquisition have led scholars such as Tomasello et al. (2005) to postulate the existence of
a universal human “sociocognitive infrastructure” that drives joint social activities and is
biologically inherited. This infrastructure would include the skill of precocious intention-
reading, and is meant to explain human linguistic development and cultural learning.
However, the cognitivist and functionalist assumptions on which this model relies have
resulted in controversial hypotheses (i.e., intention-reading as the ontogenetic precursor
of language) which take a contentious conception of mind and language for granted.
By challenging this model, I will show that we should instead turn ourselves towards a
constitutive explanation of language within a “bio-logical” understanding of interactivity.
This is possible only by abandoning the cognitivist conception of organism and traditional
views of language. An epistemological shift must therefore be proposed, based on
embodied, enactive and distributed approaches, and on Maturana’s work in particular. The
notions of languaging and observing that will be discussed in this article will allow for a
bio-logically grounded, theoretically parsimonious alternative to mentalist and spectatorial
approaches, and will guide us towards a wider understanding of our sociocultural mode of
living.
Keywords: social interaction, recursive consensual coordination, languaging, observing, bio-logical approach,
Maturana,Tomasello, intention-reading
SOCIAL COGNITION AND LANGUAGE
Over the last decades, “social cognition” has become the object of
intense interdisciplinary research. Many theoretical and empirical
efforts have been dedicated to understanding the speciﬁc condi-
tions on which human interaction and the ontogenetic develop-
ment of our socio-interactional skills rely. In this context, explain-
ing how individuals involved in interaction solve the “problem of
other minds” in order to conduct effective coordination stands
out as a major challenge for many scholars. However, a debate
has ﬂourished concerning the validity of supposing some kind of
“mindreading” to account for social interaction. Whereas the cog-
nitivist accounts view this as a crucial issue (e.g., Frith, 2008) and
propose several models to resolve it, the embodied and enactive
approaches consider representational and spectatorial explana-
tions of human interactivity to be inadequate. According to the lat-
ter, social engagement with others does not fundamentally consti-
tute a cognitive problem to be solved through themutual detection
of mental states by the interacting individuals; rather, it is the result
of embodied, ecologically embedded, intersubjective dynamics
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Gallagher, 2008a,b; Hutto, 2009;
De Jaegher et al., 2010; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012).
Consistent with non-mentalist approaches to interaction, I
would like todirect our attention tohow the explanationof linguis-
tic activity can broaden our understanding of human interaction
and sociality. Up to the present, theories in the cross-disciplinary
domain of social cognition have not privileged the investiga-
tion of the linguistic phenomenon, or have taken traditional
views of language for granted. A partial exception to this is
Tomasello’s inﬂuential research conducted on joint activity, lead-
ing to the author’s hypothesis of a functional relation linking
intention-reading to language, and language acquisition in par-
ticular. However, this hypothesis is questionable, as is Tomasello’s
conception of language.
A major obstacle for understanding the constitutive relation
that links language to social interaction is the fact that the linguis-
tic phenomenon is still frequently conceived in inadequate terms.
Here Iwill propose an alternative explanationof both language and
social interaction using a different epistemological framework. To
this end, I will ﬁrst draw on Tomasello’s model to discuss the limits
of cognitivist approaches, including those that are more“sociocul-
turally oriented.” I will subsequently show how these limits can be
overcome.
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Building on developmental and comparative research,
Tomasello et al. (2005) offer an interdisciplinary approach in
order to explain language and culture by tracing them to the
foundational conditions of social engagement and joint activity
(e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 1999, 2003). According
to Tomasello, both human collaborative activities and communi-
cation – conceived as a special activity based on the utilization
of “linguistic symbols” as cultural artifacts – are possible thanks
to our prosocial dispositions and certain unique cognitive skills.
Modiﬁed throughout the years, the most recent version of this
theory downplays the simulationist positions previously held by
Tomasello (1999) and postulates that a species-speciﬁc sociocogni-
tive infrastructure provides humans with the capacity for “shared
intentionality”1 (Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2008). Along
these lines, Tomasello puts forth the theory of a universally
inherited infrastructure which would include skills for imita-
tive learning and role-reversal, a disposition for cooperation and
the uniquely human skill of recursive intention-reading, allow-
ing us to understand communicative intentions cooperatively.
In language sciences, similar arguments have been proposed by
Levinson, among others, in his hypothesis of an innate and
universal “interaction engine” (Levinson, 2006a,b).
Supported by a host of experiments, Tomasello’s theory is
supposed to account for, among other things, the ontogenetic
emergence of “joint attention” in infants’ early interactions. Begin-
ning around nine months of age, infants start to jointly attend to
objects with others in interactive settings, following the other’s
gaze (Scaife and Bruner, 1975; Bruner, 1977), and starting to
respond to and initiate pointing gestures (Bates et al., 1975). While
the explanation of the emergence of such “triadic” interactions is
the object of ﬁerce debate (see, e.g., Eilan et al., 2005; Seemann,
2011), Tomasello, in agreement with Bruner’s (1995) conception
of just such a developmental step as the ﬁrst “meeting of minds,”
argues that the emergence of joint attention reveals the develop-
ment of intention-reading skills, permitting the child to “know
together” with his caregivers that they are attending to the same
thing (Tomasello, 2008). This is supposedly the ﬁrst step in the
subsequent development of full-ﬂedged mindreading (Lohmann
et al., 2005; Tomasello et al., 2005).
What then is the impact of this hypothesis on our under-
standing of language? Tomasello argues that not only could the
hypothesis of a sociocognitive infrastructure explain language
acquisition, it could also offer important insights for compara-
tive research as well as phylogenetic investigation into the origins
of language. The crucial point here is that the conventionalized
symbolic system which we use to coordinate with each other in
joint activities, or “linguistic code” as it is labeled by Tomasello,
“(. . .) rests on a nonlinguistic infrastructure of intentional under-
standing and commonconceptual ground,which is in fact logically
primary” (Tomasello, 2008: 58). By discovering the communica-
tive intentions of the others, the child ontogenetically acquires
skills for communication, typically by ﬁrst understanding and
1According to Tomasello, “shared intentionality,” presented as the mutual acknowl-
edgment of joint commitment and joint intentions between interacting individuals,
is a necessary condition for the realization of human practices, since they all
supposedly involve “sharing of psychological states” in a cooperative goal.
initiating activities based on joint attention (for example, by point-
ing at objects in order to request them), and then by appropriating
intention-based expressions addressed to him by adults. In this
manner, precocious intention-reading gradually allows the child
to grasp the meaning and function of conventional symbols,
which can be then mapped into usage-patterns (Tomasello, 2003).
In other words, Tomasello’s model supposes that shared under-
standing of goals and recursive intention-reading are already in
place when children begin to speak. According to this model,
the sociocognitive infrastructure is a prerequisite for language
acquisition and is, in fact, its developmental precursor. In line
with this, Tomasello recommends that studies on the phyloge-
netic origins of both language and cultural life should include
an inquiry into the evolution of this sociocognitive infrastructure
as a necessary preadaptation for the emergence of language and
culture. Moreover, he argues that qualitative differences between
contemporary primates with regard to social engagement and
symbolic communication would be explained by the hypothe-
sis that non-human primates lack just such a species-speciﬁc
skill enabling the detection of communicative intentions in a
cooperative goal.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer an exhaustive anal-
ysis of Tomasello’s theory, so I will not be able to address all of
its important insights concerning cooperation and human social-
ity (e.g., Tomasello, 2009, 2011). I will restrict myself to discussing
the explanation provided for interaction and language through the
notion of intention-reading, in order to present a non-mentalist
approach to the same questions.
Prima facie, looking to social interaction and joint activity in
order to seek out the raison d’être of language may not seem prob-
lematic in itself; quite the contrary. As opposed to formalist and
nativist views of language, the conception of linguistic phenom-
ena as inherently social and activity-grounded can be linked to
several long-standing positions held both in linguistics and philos-
ophy. Undoubtedly, any theorization about the precise conditions
necessary for language to emerge within interactional real-time
dynamics – which is admittedly one of the principal aims of
Tomasello’s work – is a precious contribution.
However, when it comes to the hypothesis provided,
Tomasello’s model remains highly contentious. First of all,
Tomasello’s position has garnered criticism concerning the pos-
tulated precocious emergence of intention-reading, as well as
the complex meta-representations and recursivity it would entail
(Grifﬁn and Dennett, 2008; Moore and Barresi, 2010; Reboul,
2010). Another controversial issue concerns the idea that a com-
municative intention could be understood independently from the
precise linguistic forms that express it; by deﬁnition, one cannot
come without the other (for a similar argument, see Taylor and
Shanker, 2003). Tomasello actually argues in favor of a causal rela-
tion between a communicative intention and its linguistic form, in
that the grasping of the former leads to the subsequent appropria-
tion of the latter. However, although Tomasello claims to draw on
philosophy of language for such notions as “non-natural mean-
ing” (Grice, 1989) and communicative intention, it should be
observed that the theories to which he refers do not imply the
“developmental claim that an understanding of intentions comes
before communication” (Racine, 2011: 33). In addition to this,
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and more importantly, Tomasello offers no operational explana-
tion for the emergence of any mechanism of intention-reading; it
is merely assumed to exist, as though it were a “X-ray perception”
of intentions (Cowley, 2004). For this reason, I contend that this
mechanism is not at all operationally grounded. The emergence of
such a functional skill remains unexplained, although seemingly
justiﬁed by its putative function in bio-logical heritage as sort of
cognitive leap separating humans from other primates (Raimondi,
2013). Based on our knowledge of living beings, what operational
foundation would allow the assumption that a human organism
could develop such a mechanism by the age of nine months?
One of the main limits of the hypothesis is that an intention-
reading mechanism should be explained starting from its own
conditions of possibility. However, as soon as we try to show its
emergence, we become aware that precocious intention-reading is
neither operationally possible nor necessary.
While Tomasello rejects the existence of a Chomskian lin-
guistic faculty, he proposes a sociocognitive infrastructure based
on a similar conception of organism and ontogenetic develop-
ment. Ultimately, Tomasello’s model relies on highly questionable
assumptions about the status of language as a symbolic conven-
tional tool and the role of mind in the explanation of interaction.
The hypothesis of intention-reading as a precursor to linguistic
learning is therefore dependent on controversial epistemological
background.
I would therefore suggest a shift in focus to address the issue
of the constitutive relation between interaction, joint activity and
language on radically different epistemological bases. On the one
hand, I will challenge Tomasello’s conception of mind, interaction
and language. On the other hand, I will propose alternative the-
oretical arguments to show that language and human interaction
are not functionally but constitutively related as they take place in
the same operational-relational matrix. This means that we need
to show how individuals, through the operation of mutual cou-
pling, generate the interindividual domain to which linguistic and
interactional phenomena should be traced in order for them to be
explained. By the same token, it will become possible to under-
stand why we cannot consider such phenomena to be the product
of any faculty or property of the mind, precluding any mentalist
explanation to account for their generation.
INTERACTION, SEE UNDER MIND
Along with others scholars (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007;
Gallagher, 2008a,b; Leudar and Costall, 2009; De Jaegher et al.,
2010; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012), I argue that cognitivist
approaches are inadequate to provide an explanation of social
interaction. I discuss some of the issues related to such approaches
by drawing on Tomasello’s model. After all, the sociocultural
approach which Tomasello seeks to provide does not prevent him
from relying on a conception of “mind” that, however “socially
oriented,” remains committed to the some traditional cogni-
tivist assumptions about mind and behavior. Epistemogically,
this model endorses mentalist and folk-psychological views of
organism as well as a spectatorial conception of interaction.
Mentalist assumptions include the idea that all phenomena
related to the individual’s interactions with his environment could
be explained by the presence of a mental mechanism which would
be functionally responsible for the generation of said phenomena
(in thepresent case, Tomasello’s recursive intention-reading is such
a mechanism). This supposes a hierarchical organization inherent
to the organism whereby phenomena belonging to the behavioral
level arise as speciﬁed by processes taking place at another level,
whether the latter be mental mechanisms or the neurobiologi-
cal implementation of these mechanisms. Cognitive mechanisms
are therefore assumed to be endowed with causal powers in the
generation of behavior. Accordingly, they determine the adap-
tive competence of the organism that interacts with its medium.
Such a hierarchical relation between mind and behavior is thus
viewed as fundamental. This is consistent with the representation-
alist conception of cognition as an internal process that generates
a representation of the environment in order produce an adequate
response to it. Within this tradition of thinking, since subper-
sonal operations supposedly explain the organism’s “know-how,”
mentalist explanations seem to be a suitable way to account for
interactional phenomena.
By folk-psychological characterizations of mind, I refer to the
pervasive idea that intentions and other mental states, normally
ascribed to agents in daily life, are entities that exist on a more fun-
damental level than the behaving agents themselves. For example,
Tomasello et al. (2005) endorse a mentalist and folk-psychological
view of cognition in assuming that intentions and goals drive the
genesis of behavior that is adaptive to the sociocultural niche. From
this perspective, “intention” is actually conceived as an “internal
entity that guides the person’s behavior” (Tomasello et al., 2005:
676).
Mentalist and folk-psychological views of cognition are inti-
mately connected to an intellectualist postulate which assigns a
spectatorial position to interacting individuals. According to such
a view, these interacting individuals are being constantly faced
with the problem of mutually detecting and predicting the mental
states underlying the other’s behavior. Because of this assumption,
Tomasello argues that shared intentionality, as the foundation of
joint activity and communication, can only be achieved through
special skills allowing the comprehension of others’ cooperative
intentions. The spectatorial view implies that the agent needs to
represent the others’ minds in order to achieve intersubjectivity
with them. Since intentions are supposedly internal entities that
cause behavior, a child is immediately faced with the problem
of making sense of the behavior of adults. Before he can grasp
intentions, “(. . .) from the infant’s point of view the adult is just
making noise (for whatever reason)”(Tomasello, 2003: 23). There-
fore, bridging the self/other gap requires an ad hoc infrastructure.
However, this functionalist explanation relies on the creation of
a mechanism coherent with the problem that the analyst himself
posits as such.
By drawing on Tomasello’s model, I have brieﬂy illustrated
some of the epistemological reasons why many studies of social
cognition consider humanbeings to be spectators of others’behav-
ior, and focus on individual mechanisms in order to explain how
we act together and understand each other in interactive set-
tings. However, I contend that these assumptions are based on an
inadequate conception of organism, and that cognitivist heuristics
unavoidably lead to a one-dimensional, individually-grounded
notion of interaction. It should be remarked that the conﬂation of
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interactional and individual in the cognitivist approach causes us
to lose sight of the interactional as a distinct domain.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BACKGROUND FOR A BIO-LOGICAL
EXPLANATION OF INTERACTION
As an alternative epistemological paradigm, I will rely on
Maturana’s “Biology of cognition” (Maturana, 1978, 1988, 2002),
and on some assumptions shared by embodied and enactive
approaches. In the interest of brevity I will only highlight cer-
tain aspects of Maturana’s theoretical contribution and I will
assume that most of its core features (e.g., autopoietic organiza-
tion, structural determinism, nervous system’s operational closure
etc.) are already familiar to the reader, as well as its similarities and
differences with regards to the enactive and embodied approaches.
What I deﬁne hereafter as a “bio-logical approach” is based on
just such a non-reductionist epistemological framework. In a nut-
shell, taking a bio-logical stance to account for interaction means
seeking out the conditions of possibility for all phenomena related
to interacting individuals by drawing on our understanding of
living beings. To this end, we need to make explicit the systemic
conditions under which social interaction exists, clarify its rela-
tion with the constitution of living beings, and provide it with
a generative explanation. By “generative explanation,” I mean an
explanation that ﬁrst traces the phenomena requiring explanation
to the existential domain where they belong, and then proposes
a mechanism that generates the explanandum. In this case, the
phenomena to be explained are social interaction and language.
The bio-logical approach challenges the traditional cognitivist
view of living being. Whereas the latter takes for granted a hierar-
chical organization (wherein the neurobiological level determines
and controls the behavioral level, as we have seen above), the for-
mer posits two non-hierarchically related domains: on one hand,
the domain of the living being’s structural components, and on
the other, the domain in which the living being exists as an organ-
ism. Like every system, living beings basically exist as such in two
co-occurrent domains: one in which it can be seen as an organism
operating as a whole in interaction with its medium; and one in
which it exists as a composite entity which can be deconstructed in
order to observe its molecular and supramolecular components,
its internal dynamics, and its structural changes. As Maturana
argues, these two domains “do not intersect”: they constitute two
radically different domains of phenomena that cannot be reduced
to each other. Consequently, any attempt to explain the phenom-
ena of one domain in terms of the other is inadequate. There is,
however, a dynamic generative relation between them arising from
the structural changes that the living being and its medium trigger
in each other during the course of their “structural coupling” (see,
e.g., Maturana et al., 1995).
Let us examine what adopting this view implies. On one hand,
neurobiological processes belong to the domain of structural com-
ponents. On the other hand, the apparent and non-apparent
dimensions of the relational operation of the living being with
its medium, such as behavior, mind, and emotions, constitute
the “operational sphere” of the organism as a whole, and cannot
be traced to the domain of components. Although the structural
dynamics that takes place in the domain of the components par-
ticipate in the systemic process, these dimensions pertain to the
organism as a whole and denote classes of phenomena that take
place in the operational domain in which the individual exists as
such. Strictly speaking, such dimensions are determined neither
by the system’s structure (the “inside”) nor by the medium’s struc-
ture (the “outside”), but are dependent on the dynamic interplay
between the two. However, this co-modulation is constrained by
the structures of both the organism and the medium. The result
of this structurally determined dynamic is the generation of the
operational relational matrix in which the organism exists at every
moment in the course of its living as a spontaneous outcome
of both a phylogenetic and ontogenetic history. The organism’s
existential domain is therefore inherently operational and relational.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this approach. First,
it prevents us from assuming a neurocentric conception of cog-
nition. Cognition concerns the organism as a whole, not its
components. Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) have shown that
the neural network operates as a closed system and does not have
inputs and outputs, properly speaking. For that reason, the ner-
vous system does not and cannot pick up information from the
environment in order to compute a representation of it, nor can it
specify the phenomena taking place in the domain of the organism
as a whole. The role and the adaptive character of neurobiological
processes in the generation of the organism-as-a-whole’s relational
operation are to be understood as part of a systemic, dynamic
process that involves both the operations of the organism and the
medium (see, e.g., Maturana, 2000). This dynamic triggers struc-
tural changes in both the living being and its medium in such a
manner that they cannot be anything but congruent to each other
until the living being dies.
Second, this approach prevents us from accepting mentalist
explanations. Unlike the traditional cognitivist position, the bio-
logical framework allows the relation between different dimen-
sions of the individual’s operational sphere, such as those of
behavior and mind, to be understood in terms of systemic sol-
idarity; that is to say, one dimension does not specify the features
of another, neither do the different dimensions “exert a control”
over each other. In other words, within the organism’s operational
sphere, no dimension is to be considered as more fundamental
than the others. However, the multidimensional architecture of
the organism’s operational sphere and its constitutive systemic
dynamics allows us, as observers, to establish correlations between
its different dimensions. As a matter of fact, if behavior, mind and
emotion are different yet interdependent dimensions of the organ-
ism’s operational sphere, they could be conceived as Borromean
rings, simultaneously distinct and interlocking.
Finally, since the mind is a dimension of the operation of the
organism as a whole (and therefore does not coincide with neu-
robiological processes), and since the nervous system cannot be
said to determine the generation of the organism’s operation, no
linear causal power concerning the generation of behavior can
properly be assigned to brain or mind, as is the case in mental-
ist approaches. Furthermore, intentions and goals belong to our
description of the organism’s operational sphere in relation to its
medium, and not to neurobiological processes. At the same time,
it is clear that rejecting the Cartesian conception of mind does not
imply that one subscribes to any kind of eliminativism or physi-
calism. Rather, it suggests that, as Keijzer (2001: 33) argues, “mind
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applies at a personal level anddoes not provide a conceptual frame-
work which speciﬁes how subpersonal processes operate to bring
a person’s behavioral capacities into being.” To this we can add
that operational-relational capacities are brought into being not
by neurobiological processes alone, but by the dynamic interplay
between these processes and the medium.
Byunderstanding that the organism’s existential domain should
be regarded as inherently operational and relational, it becomes
possible to see all phenomena related to an organism’s relational
operation as belonging to the domain of its realization as a whole.
Social interaction, joint activities and language are not explainable
as products of neurobiological dynamics or other inner mecha-
nisms, since they take place in the relational domain. Thus, their
emergence and speciﬁc features can only legitimately be explained
with reference to the human operational–relational matrix.
THE DOMAIN OF INTERACTION AND COORDINATION
Based on the bio-logics of living beings, what are the conditions
through which human social interaction emerges and how are
these conditions linked to language? Concerning interaction, I
would like to emphasize that the bio-logical approach allows us to
shift from an explanation of interaction centered on individuals
to an explanation of interaction within its own domain as such. In
focusing on the relational domain of interaction, we are aware that
although this domain is brought forth through the operation of
two or more organisms conserving their independent identities,
it possesses its own organization. This approach radically chal-
lenges the individualist understanding of interactivity, and puts
the interactional process at the heart of the present inquiry.
Let us begin by developing an explanation of interaction that
will draw on the bio-logical standpoint. As seen before, the organ-
ism as a whole is structurally coupled to its medium, and the
mutually adaptive relation between the two is an existential con-
dition that results from a speciﬁc ontogenetic and phylogenetic
history. Most importantly, the organism as a whole exists pre-
cisely through the relational operation of coupling. The relational
operation is thus not episodic – rather it is brought forth by an
ongoing, necessarily continuous dynamic. Interaction between
organisms can therefore be better understood as a spontaneous
and inevitable consequence of structural coupling; that is to say,
as a recurrent event in the ontogenetic history of living beings2.
It follows that our understanding of interaction is logically sub-
ordinated to our understanding of the constitutive conditions of
structural coupling. In other words, in accordance with Maturana
and Varela, we can say that interaction is subordinated the con-
servation of the invariant conditions of living: that is to say, the
autopoietic organization of living being (which takes place in the
domain of components) and the organism’s relation of adaptation
to its medium (which takes place in the domain of the organism as
a whole). In other words, we do not need to provide any justiﬁca-
tion for the fact that interactions happen all the time throughout
the biosphere, nor for the effectiveness of these interactions. What
2In this paper I will maintain a distinction between the terms “interaction” and
“structural coupling”; while employing the latter to refer to the bidirectional, con-
stant mutual triggering between organism and its biotic and abiotic medium, I
reserve the use of the former to refer to delimited events where a given sequence of
interlocked operations is distinguishable between two or more organisms.
is needed is instead to identify the conditions that generate differ-
ent interactional phenomena among different species in general,
and joint activity amongst human beings in particular.
It is clear that from a non-representationalist point of view,
interaction can often be analyzed as a bi-directional, co-regulated
dynamic of coordination, as shown by theorists of both dynam-
ics systems and enactive approaches (e.g., Fogel, 1993a,b; De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Fogel and Garvey, 2007). In line with
Maturana’s deﬁnition, I argue that we can speak of consensual
coordination when:
(1) during an event of interaction, we can distinguish an unfold-
ing sequence of interrelated operations which are evidence
of an interdependence between the operational spheres of
individuals involved;
(2) these patterns of interrelated operations are the spontaneous
result of a speciﬁc history of interaction and are inherently
contingent on that peculiar co-ontogenetic history;
(3) the consequences of such an event on the respective opera-
tional spheres result in subsequent interactions.
Thus deﬁned, consensual coordination is similar to the etho-
logical notion of “ontogenetic ritualization,” which is frequently
observed in several species and in non-human primates in particu-
lar (see Tomasello, 1999). By emphasizing the consensual character
of this coordination I highlight two key aspects: ﬁrst, that the rela-
tion between the observed interdependent behaviors would not
be observed without a speciﬁc ontogenetic history, and second,
that this coordination occurs as the spontaneous consequence of
coupling. Although the term“consensual” employed by Maturana
can evoke agreement and may therefore be perceived by some as
ambiguous, the proposed deﬁnition should clarify its meaning in
the context of a bio-logical approach. Furthermore, it should be
clear that the emergence of consensual coordination is not a con-
sequence of a deliberate, planned strategy, nor does it include goal
directedness; rather, the establishment of consensual coordination
allows individuals to successively draw on an already established
“consensual domain”of coordination patterns, in order to operate
“strategically.” Taking this deﬁnition into account, “coordination”
will hereafter refer only to consensual coordination.
With that said, if we focus on interaction and consensual coor-
dination alone, we cannot entirely explain how language and
complex human sociocultural practices can emerge. This becomes
clear as soon as we note that, from a bio-logical viewpoint, coordi-
nation cannot be seen as a communicative setting or “information
transmission.” It would be misleading to speak of “communica-
tion” in order to account for animal coordination. This would
mean that the conduct of the individuals involved “conveys a
message” which refers to circumstances related to the message’s
emission,“as if what determines the course of the interaction were
the meaning and not the dynamics of structural coupling of the
interacting organisms” (Maturana and Varela, 1992: 207). Con-
sensual coordination does not rely on this informational model.
No “information” is exchanged and no object can be denoted or
observed by the interacting individuals. Any alleged exchange of
signals between coordinating individuals is only a description of
the interaction made by the observer (Maturana andVarela, 1980).
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We must still wonder which speciﬁcity inherent to human cou-
pling gives rise to language, compared to other modes of living
in the biosphere where language is apparently absent. To explain
the emergence of human cultural and linguistic phenomena, it is
therefore necessary to make explicit the speciﬁc feature of human
domain of consensual coordination.
RECURSIVE CONSENSUAL COORDINATION: LANGUAGE AND
HUMAN JOINT ACTIVITIES
Given this deﬁnition of consensual coordination between inter-
acting individuals, I would argue that a bio-logical explanation
of language and joint activity can be provided. In line with the
previous considerations, this explanation must trace language’s
constitutive conditions to the bio-logics of living systems. In keep-
ing with Maturana (1988), our question could be formulated as
follows: under which circumstances within the history of inter-
actions between living beings can language emerge? Or, in other
words, how can we explain linguistic activity as a class of phenom-
ena related to structural coupling, and therefore as a consequence
of a speciﬁc history of coexistence between living beings? This is
an epistemological question that must ﬁrst be answered from a
theoretical standpoint.
Social interaction is fundamental in species for which indi-
vidual ontogeny occurs as a part of a network of co-ontogenies
brought about through consensual coordination. In human inter-
actions, it is the emergence of recursion within the consensual
domain that gives rise to the classes of inherently social phe-
nomena that we distinguish as language, communication, and
more generally, human sociocultural practices. Recursive consen-
sual coordination is, in effect, the generative mechanism we were
looking for. Building on Maturana’s work, I choose to deﬁne lan-
guaging as a process based on recursive consensual coordination of
individuals’ interrelated operations, taking place in the interindivid-
ual relational domain. Minimal languaging appears in the domain
of interaction as soon as individuals operate a coordination which
takes place, recursively, “at the top”of their historically established
domain of coordination. The new classes of operations that one
can thereby distinguish still consist of consensually interrelated
operations. However, theydiffer from those basedon“ﬂat”consen-
sual coordination in that they only take place through a recursive
process which draws on the history of other coordinated oper-
ations brought about by the individuals in prolonged, intimate
coexistence.
To clarify the power of recursive coordination, it is best to see
an example of how it functions. Let us consider a “ﬂat” human
coordination such as the passing of toys between an infant and his
caregiver. This activity presents many aspects of a coordination
framework that we can observe in other species. However, a new
framework appears if the infant and his caregiver bring about a
new coordination by recursively drawing on the pre-established
one as an operational basis; i.e., when activity such as the play of
passing toys allows the emergence of a new activity that includes
the request to pass said objects. The circumstances are similar but
we can now observe a new class of phenomena. Vocalization, ges-
tures, movements, and the other interrelated operations are now
elements of a recursive consensual coordination that is identiﬁable
as a new activity. This new class of doing things together cannot be
reduced to the previously established class; however, its possibility
relies precisely on this previously established class.
This basic example shows that the process of languaging
constitutes an astounding expansion of individuals’ operational
relationalmatrix, and that it allows the generation of new classes of
interrelated operations that are bio-logically possible only through
recursion. Importantly, these classes of operations constitute our
human doings; they coincide with our “doing things together”
in coexistence as different types of joint activities. Moreover,
because of the multiplying character of recursivity, new coordi-
nation can occur recursively in the ﬂow of “doing things with
others.” The ﬂow of languaging should therefore be understood
from within the mutual operational-relational interdependencies
which it brings about. This ﬂow of coordination extends beyond
isolated occurrences of coordination: individuals’ respective oper-
ational spheres (including our behavioral, mental and emotional
dimensions) remain interdependent beyond the event of coor-
dination. Ontogenetically, the languaging ﬂow sets a matrix of
interdependence within which all our operations as human beings
exist. “Doing things with the others” through recursive consensual
coordination can therefore be considered as the invariant orga-
nization of the systemic dynamic of human structural coupling.
In other words, languaging constitutes a species-speciﬁc feature
of the mode of living through which we human beings exist as
a distinct class of organisms. This mode of living constitutes the
human“ontogenetic phenotype” (notion introduced by Maturana
and Mpodozis, 2000; see, e.g.,Maturana andVerden-Zöller, 2008);
or to put it another way, the core feature of our “developmental
system” (Oyama, 2000; Oyama et al., 2001).
Although it is not possible to develop these notions at length
within the limits of this article, it is important to show the
theoretical implications of an approach in terms of languag-
ing compared to other conceptions of language. What we call
“language” coincides with constitutive elements of coordination
within languaging. Language therefore belongs to the process
of languaging and can be considered as a multi-scalar system of
discriminant differences which allow us to bring about different
forms of activities. In such as regards the complex systems of
dynamic operational conﬁgurations brought about by each event
of recursive coordination, these elements can be considered as
“semiotic elements” precisely in that they specify different con-
ﬁgurations of coordination. By the same token, aspects of our
operation that do not result in a difference of coordination are
not “semiotic elements” in relation to a given contingent, consen-
sual domain. Undoubtedly, we can distinguish some of the more
salient classes of semiotic elements within our present cultures,
and we can study them using the most thorough and sophis-
ticated systems of analyzable regularities (lexical, grammatical
and phonological). At the same time, other systems of regular-
ities relating to the event of coordination can now be taken into
account: gesture, prosody, conversational turns etc. (e.g., Kendon,
1990; McNeill, 1992; Schegloff, 2007). Nevertheless, all these sys-
tems of regularities do not explain languaging themselves, nor do
they exhaustively describe the operational architecture underlying
recursive coordination.
In several aspects, the explanation of languaging allows us
to embrace the dialogical, actional view of language as opposed
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to an internalist, monological view (Linell, 2009). In keeping
with the distributed approach to language (Cowley, 2007, 2011;
Thibault, 2011), it should be noted that the event of coordination
is a co-constructed dynamic that engages the embodied organism
and occurs in real-time interactivity. Such a dynamic unfolds on
extremely fast time-scales, measurable in fractions of a second.
Meaning is directly inherent to the ﬂow of recursive coordina-
tion and to its contextual operational architecture within each
interactive situation.
Here I would like to emphasize that by identifying “recursive
consensual coordination” as the generative mechanism underly-
ing such a real-time, interactional process, we can understand
what makes it unique in comparison to other kinds of “ﬂat” coor-
dination. Importantly, since it is operationally grounded on the
bio-logics of structural coupling, languaging can be traced to
interaction and coordination, yet it constitutes phenomena whose
properties are not reducible to them. Moreover, this process takes
place in a ﬂow of operational interdependence that goes beyond
the setting of any single event of coordination, and whose result
is the network of human practices. Also, it is clear that language
cannot be considered as being either logically primary or sec-
ondary to sociocultural activities, because language and recursive
coordination are necessarily co-occurrent. Although they can be
analytically distinguished, human joint activity and language arise
from the same process; one is not the cause of the other.
As we have previously examined, the emergence of consensual
recursive coordination does not require any previous agreement
between interacting individuals. Rather, such coordination relies
on the congruent transformation of our operational spheres dur-
ing the process of living together, and it is a systemic, spontaneous
result of this process. Recursive coordination does not therefore
require agreement, or previous understanding; on the contrary,
it is the condition by which agreement and understanding can
arise. In fact, coordination does not even presuppose coopera-
tion, since cooperation refers to the conﬁguration of emotionning
within which a given coordination is brought about. Even though
cooperative coordination is crucial to human mode of life, what
is proposed here is not an irenic vision of interaction; it includes
all antagonistic forms of coordination (negotiations, conﬂicts) in
as much as all these forms do not invalidate but rather intrin-
sically conﬁrm the consensual character of coordination, along
with the constitutive interdependence between individuals’ oper-
ational spheres. This occurs as conversation. What I refer to as
“conversation” is a ﬂow of languaging where individuals operate
a recursive coordination which draws on the consensual dis-
tinction of the conﬁguration of interrelated operations brought
about by a previous occurrence of recursive coordination. For
example, in conversation we can refuse or negotiate the “com-
municative actions” enacted (or “projected”) by others, actions
that by deﬁnition specify a certain immediate or future effective
interrelation between the operational sphere of others and our
own. As a result, conversation allows us, by operating in languag-
ing, to modulate or to change the course of the dynamic ﬂow
of our operational interdependence. Since this shift in the ﬂow
of languaging occurs through recursive coordination, it does not
disintegrate the interrelation between our operational spheres, but
allows an expansion of it while remaining within the realm of
languaging. The same is true for such events as misunderstand-
ings (or lack of understanding), that can be “repaired” through
recursive coordination. Conversation provides the possibility of
a fully human reciprocity, which in turn makes it possible to
preserve languaging by languaging. Without conversation, our
interactions would only be the accumulation of simple sequences
of recursive coordination. Finally, conversation represents an
immensely complex evolution compared with the phenomena
brought about by “ﬂat” coordination. I would go so far as to
say that conversation is one of the fundamental aspects of our
living-through-languaging.
INTEROBJECTIVE DISTINCTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
OBSERVING
Having introduced recursive consensual coordination as the gen-
erative mechanism of language and joint activity, I need to make
explicit another fundamental aspect of languaging. The following
should further clarify the relevance of the bio-logical approach in
order to overcome cognitivist accounts of the emergence of social
interaction and joint activity, such as Tomasello’s. The spectatorial
position that cognitivists ascribe to interacting individuals implies
that they engage in the observation of objects, persons, intentions,
“shared knowledge” and “common ground.” However, this obser-
vation cannot bio-logically precede recursive coordination and
therefore cannot be a precondition of language and joint activity.
To the contrary, I will show that such an operation of observing is
generated precisely through languaging.
As claimed earlier in this paper, non-human animal interac-
tions do not and could not take place by “referring to objects.”
However, we should now explain how we as human beings refer
to the circumstances related to our operation. To this end, it is
necessary to deﬁne what is intended here as an object. Within
the presented epistemological framework, objects are dynamic
operational conﬁgurations related to recursive coordination and
therefore to our relational operation. While objects are admittedly
constituted through the operations of each of us as single indi-
viduals, their constitution relies on recursive coordination with
others. More speciﬁcally, I consider that objects are the sine qua
non operational condition for recursive coordination. Recursive
coordination is brought about by taking a given conﬁguration of
interrelated operations as the operational basis for a further coor-
dination. These conﬁgurations of operations remain obscured to
the individuals, who only operate different kind of distinctions:
“Objects arise in language as operations of coordinations of coor-
dinations of doings that stand as coordinations of doings about
which we recursively coordinate our doings as languaging beings”
(Maturana, 2002: 28).
From a cognitive point of view, objects depend on operating
consensual “interobjective” distinctions, that is to say, distinctions
related to the conﬁguration of interrelated operations which bring
about a recursive consensual coordination. Ontogenetically, the
process of languaging leads to the routinization of distinguish-
ing objects (entities, relations, processes). This epistemological
explanation implies that, for the individuals, objects are as expe-
rientially present and real as the operations that allow them
to arise, independently from the domain – physical, relational,
abstract, imaginary – in which they can be classed by an observer
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thereafter. With regard to individuals operating recursive coordi-
nation, objects exist ﬁrst as immediate conﬁgurations of operation
and can then be observed as objects through a subsequent recursive
operation, as distinctions of distinctions of distinctions.
Let us explore what I mean by observing. If the previous con-
siderations are clear, we can go a step further and consider what
happens when individuals start distinguishing their own interob-
jective distinctions through recursive coordination. « Observing »
becomes then possible: recursively operating on interobjective dis-
tinctions is equivalent to being mindful about the objects that are
distinguished through coordination. In this regard it is important
to note that observing is a process that relies on the bio-logics of
living beings, to the extent that observing is a possibility inherent
to the operation of the organism as a whole, provided that it can
operate through recursive consensual coordination. In this light,
while observing is admittedly possible only under some speciﬁc
conditions (with a given phylogenetic trajectory and an ontoge-
netic history of coexistence while doing things together through
languaging), it can be explained as a bio-logical operation without
basing it on any other principle or functional device. By making
us distinguish our own distinctions in terms of entities, expe-
riences and feelings, observing is therefore another key element
in the explanation of the sociocultural practices that character-
ize the human mode of life. In effect, it is through the operation
of observing that description-making, development of narrative
skills and reﬂection become possible. These operations draw on
the process of distinction of objects arising in recursive coordi-
nation, and on its increasing recursive complexity. Furthermore,
as we learn to operate distinctions through the practices within
which objects exist, these objects can be operated independently
of the single occurrences of interaction. This means that they
are gradually embodied in the relational operation of structural
coupling to our medium and are operated recurrently in the pro-
cess of making sense of daily human life – even during solitary
activities.
Virtually all conﬁgurations of operations can become objects in
the process of languaging and therefore expand the interindividual
domain of objects and practices. More generally, we are dealing
with what Maturana would call an “interobjective domain” (2000,
2005), which includes both observed and non-observed objects,
and is constitutively open to dynamic expansion and change, since
it is strictly contingent on historical and situated circumstances
of coordination. This being said, it is clear that the term “inter-
objective domain” relates to an abstraction that one can make
of a network of dynamic languaging ﬂows. These ﬂows always
take place in an ever-changing present during the course of inter-
actions within a given network of human beings, and follow a
not-pre-established drift which draws on an inherently peculiar,
cultural history of recursive coordination. It should be remarked
that the notion of “interobjective domain” can be partially assim-
ilated into that of “common ground” (Clark, 1996; Tomasello,
2008), meaning that of common knowledge, assumptions, and
norms “shared” by individuals; but only if we consider the lat-
ter from a non-intellectualist, non-spectatorial standpoint. The
notion of “interobjective domain” refers to the matrix of potential
conﬁgurations of coordination operable by individuals through
languaging, at a given moment in their ontogenetic history.
We can now understand why languaging makes it possible for
human beings to reference entities and events. Since objects are
the operational condition for languaging, it follows that interac-
tions not relying on recursive consensual coordination (such as the
interactions existing between individuals of other species) also do
not entail the constitution of interobjective domains. This should
not be surprising, as modes of living which do not include “oper-
ating and observing objects” are clearly just as viable and adaptive
for those organisms which preserve structural coupling with their
medium. Where there is languaging, there are language, objects
and human sociocultural activities. Where one does not exist, nei-
ther can the others. Language, objects and human joint activities
arise together through languaging.
Logically, some epistemological consequences follow. First,
there is no original “linking problem” which individuals would
have to face in their supposed efforts to “connect” languaging to
objects. Thus, we cannot ascribe to infants the putative task of
connecting linguistic symbols to the entities existing in the world,
which Tomasello would hope to facilitate with his hypothesis of
intention-reading skills. Human beings do not resort to language
as though it were a system of symbols denoting entities that exist
beyond their recursive operation. The ﬂow of interrelated opera-
tions in languaging allows us to constitute, conserve and multiply
objects over generations. This argument challenges the repre-
sentationalist function of language and its status as a system of
“symbolic tools” that we “use,”3 although symbolic thinking does
take place in languaging. We will later see the importance of this
for language acquisition.
Second, any spectatorial account of language acquisition is
inadequate. We have seen that Tomasello considers intention-
reading as logically and ontogenetically primary. However, not
only does the bio-logical conception of organism challenge both
the mentalist and the folk-psychological assumptions behind
this hypothesis (see §3); but also, based on the explanation of
observing, infants cannot be the spectator of any “communicative
intention,” mental state or of any other type of object before they
operate interobjective distinctions. Since observing takes place in
languaging as a condition for the establishment of complex forms
of joint activity, it follows that observing can neither take place
outside of nor before recursive coordination. The infant cannot
observe any object before he begins to participate with others in
speciﬁc kinds of doings and recursive coordination. When indi-
viduals observe, that is to say when they consensually distinguish
objects related to the circumstances of coordination, they are
already languaging.
Finally, and most importantly, this approach allows us to
reconcile a non-representational conception of neurobiological
processes (since, bio-logically, the nervous system does not work
3As Maturana argues: “It is because we human beings ﬁnd ourselves operating in
language as our natural manner of being that we live language as if this were a trans-
parent instrument by means of which we coordinate our behaviors in the distinction
and handling of objects – as if these existed independently from what we do with
them – and we do not see what we are doing as we language. Because we live without
seeing what we do as we language, we do not see that what constitutes our languag-
ing is our living in a recursive ﬂow in coordinations of coordinations of doings, and
that objects arise as tokens of coordinations of doings that obscure the doings they
coordinate in this recursive ﬂow.” (Maturana, 2000: 462; italics are mine).
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 899 | 8
Raimondi Social interaction, languaging and observing
with symbols, representations or content), with the possibility
of our human “contentful mindedness.” We, as human beings,
operate objects as our cognitive way of living through languaging,
often simultaneously observing some of these objects. However, it
should be remarked that observing and consciousness constitute
only one aspect of our otherwise noncontentful moment-to-
moment operation within the ﬂow of living. Interestingly, this
explanation is congruent with Hutto and Myin’s (2013) Scaffolded
Mind Hypothesis and Developmental Explanatory Thesis, accord-
ing to which “ (. . .) all the mentality-constituting interactions are
grounded in, shaped by, and explained by nothing more, or other,
than the history of an organism’s previous interactions.”
ONTOGENETIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BIO-LOGICAL
APPROACH
Let us now consider ontogenetic development, language acquisi-
tion and the emergence of sociocultural skills from a bio-logical
standpoint. The key theoretical proposal is that children learn to
speak by languaging. This means that children actually language
before they are able to emit their ﬁrst words. In some aspects, this
turns Tomasello’s theory on its head.
First of all, I suggest that a clean separation between the prelin-
guistic and the linguistic stage does not allow us to fully grasp the
trajectory across which the operational-relational, interindividual
domain of the infant and his caregivers expands through recursive
coordination. By beginning to operate in recursive coordination
with them through joint activities very early on in his ontogeny,
a child starts participating in the network of doings that consti-
tute the culture within which his caregivers exist as human beings.
This ontogenetic process opens up a multiplicity of further joint
activities in daily coexistence.
A multitude of research has shown that coordination arises
very early in infant-caregiver interactions, starting as a mutual co-
orientation and emotional attunement (Stern, 1977; Trevarthen,
1979; Fogel, 1993b; Beebe and Lachmann, 2002; Greenspan and
Shanker, 2004). As a relational process, early interactions establish
the ﬁrst domains of interrelation between the operational spheres
of the child and his caregivers. The emotional and behavioral
attunement thus generated becomes a consensual domain open to
expansion in the course of recurrent interactions, including care
practices and play. This consensual domain, although very rich,
remains a domain of “ﬂat” coordination, in some ways similar to
that which we observe in other primates’ interactions.
However, it is precisely with the phenomena arising from joint
attention episodes that the ﬁrst events of languaging appear, bring-
ing newpossibilities to joint activity. The child can then coordinate
his attentional focus with that of the caregiver, follow objects with
his gaze in dyadic settings, and transform routines of manipula-
tion into new classes of coordinated operations. By distinguishing
objects related to patterns of coordination, he can start partici-
pating in new joint activities. To repeat what I have previously
stated concerning the example of the passing of toys, satisfying a
request pertains to a new class of interrelated actions that cannot
be assimilated into the previously established conﬁgurations of
coordination on which they depend.
The development of the child’s responsiveness to others’
doings, as well as of his own disposition to initiate an event of
coordination, is to be understood as the spontaneous result of
an ontogenetic trajectory. Across this trajectory, the variety of
conﬁgurations of coordination in which he is able to participate
gradually increase, while at the same time his structure changes in
the course of his living. This challenges the idea of a sort of devel-
opmental discontinuity represented by Tomasello’s “nine months
revolution,” the time in a child’s life at which intention-reading
skills supposedly emerge. Although episodes of recursive coordi-
nation establish a new step in the history of coexistence, what
we have here is a single process, and a single generative mech-
anism to explain its historical trajectory. In fact, sequences of
pointing (Bates et al., 1979; Tomasello, 2008) belong precisely to
some of the ﬁrst events of recursive coordination initiated by an
infant, building on the consensual domain of activities already
established. On the one hand, pointing is an operational element
of recursive coordination that relies on an operational basis of
pre-established patterns of coordination. These patterns ensure
the interrelation between operational spheres in certain circum-
stances. On the other hand, pointing provides the possibility of
establishing a new class of coordination that includes the fact of
reorienting the attention of the other. The latter results in the con-
stitution of a new class of coordinated operations, meaning that
when the child points, he is languaging, since recursive consensual
coordination is brought about by all the operational elements that
can possibly give rise to it, whether “verbal” or “non-verbal.” This
initially sporadic participation in recursive coordination gradu-
ally allows the child to expand his range of activities through the
process of operating on the consequence of recursive coordination
with his close circle of relations. From this point on, the gradual
distinction of new elements of coordination and objects occurs
together with new events of recursive coordination. This process
allows the child to acquire operational experience speciﬁc to lan-
guaging, and to make joint activity his domain of existence as
a human being. The child himself then becomes a sociocultural
agent.
Tomasello seems to have this process inmindwhen he speaks of
non-verbal, prelinguistic communication as“natural communica-
tion” (Tomasello, 2008). However, the mentalist and spectatorial
reformulation of events remains problematic in that it introduces
intention-reading as an explanatory mechanism, not only lacking
bio-logical grounding, but preventing us from grasping the fact
that we are coping with one single process – that is to say, languag-
ing. Moreover, the process that gives rise to language acquisition
and sociocultural learning can be bio-logically explained with-
out appealing to representationalist and spectatorial accounts.
Although we as observers can contemplate a metadomain in
which we associate elements of coordination and circumstances
of interaction, we cannot ascribe to the child the cognitive task of
matching objects in his world to “symbols” – a problem to which
intention-reading would provide a solution. Not only does this
solution require us to presuppose an inadequate epistemological
framework, it also causes us to lose sight of the interaction itself.
We then fail to fully understand language and joint activity as
constitutively belonging to the same process. As Maturana argues,
“Part of the difﬁculty in understanding the relation between lan-
guage and existence rests on the view of language as a domain
of representations and abstractions of entities that pertain to
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a different concrete domain. Yet language is not so, languag-
ing occurs in the concreteness of the doings of the observer in
his or her actual living in the praxis of living itself” (Maturana,
2002: 32).
OBSERVING COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS
I have shown, based on Maturana’s work, that observing is the
result of a history of interaction through languaging, and is a nec-
essary operation for our mode of living in recursive coordination.
This means that I do not need to posit any functional device for it,
but only assume that our neurobiological processes are adequate
for the relational–operational domain in which we human beings
exist.
With regard to one of the most debated subjects of social cogni-
tion, it should be now clear why folk-psychology (understanding
other’s beliefs and mental states) requires the operation of observ-
ing, and relies on the emergence of different objects that are
operated gradually in infancy as the result of an ontogenetic his-
tory of coexistence in languaging. Different objects and different
classes of recursive coordinated operations emerge gradually: self-
consciousness and reﬂection (Maturana, 2005), meta-discursive
skills (Taylor and Shanker, 2003; Taylor, 2012) and a language
stance (Cowley, 2011) as well as the understanding of narrative
practices (Hutto, 2008). All this allows the child to operate in an
interobjective domain of beliefs and mental states. The important
factor to be taken into account is therefore the process leading to
the ontogenetic establishment of such a domain.
In this context, we can add a few words about intention-reading
as presented by Tomasello. I have already made clear that the func-
tional intention-reading infrastructure as presented by Tomasello
is neither bio-logically grounded, nor required to account for
“language acquisition.”The explanation for the ontogenetic emer-
gence of social interaction, joint activity, language and objects
has been provided by drawing on the bio-logical understanding
of structural coupling and the process of recursive consensual
coordination. However, another crucial point here is that while
I have argued that intentions are not internal entities causing
behavior, it remains true that adults constantly attribute intentions
to each other in their daily life. From an epistemological stand-
point, how should we actually explain this mutual attribution of
communicative intentions?
Since intentions are not components of the living being’s struc-
tural domain, they should belong to the operational domain of
interaction. If we draw on the explanation of objects and of the
operation of observing, a rather different deﬁnition of commu-
nicative intention can be provided in place of the one presented
in many mentalist approaches. I argue that communicative inten-
tions are related to one of the previously introduced key features
of languaging: conversation. I propose that we consider that what
Tomasello, drawing on philosophy of language and pragmatics,
calls a communicative intention is not an internal entity causing
action, but instead can be explained as a class of objects consti-
tuting the sine qua non condition for conversation. These objects
coincide with the interobjective distinction of the speciﬁc way in
which individuals’ operational spheres would be interrelated by
a given recursive coordination. In other words, “communicative
intention” refers to the consensual distinction of the operational
result to which a preﬁgured coordination would lead. For exam-
ple, when a caregiver asks a child to fetch a toy, the communicative
intention is the particular operational interrelation between the
caregiver’s and the child’s operational spheres, which must be
brought about in order for that speciﬁc event of coordination
to be realized. However, for a communicative intention to exist
it has to be operated. In the present case, the communicative
intention arises as an immediate interobjective distinction when
the child and his caregiver consensually operate a recursive coor-
dination (i.e., the negotiation of the request) that modiﬁes the
preﬁgured trajectory of the operational interrelation (the request
projected by one of them). The interobjective distinction of com-
municative intention is therefore the operational basis for the
emergence of conversational classes of coordinated operations,
such as negotiation.
Put differently, as an observer, I use the term “communicative
intention” to identify a contingent interobjective distinction that is
not required for a single sequence of coordination, but that rather
makes possible a ﬂow of recursive coordination (such as a con-
versation). These distinctions, initially operated in an immediate
way by the child during his conversation with others, and only
later recursively observed, can be subsequently named through a
new recursion – for example, in the case of a given communicative
action which individuals ascribe to each other during discourse).
Finally, if communicative intentions can be “objects of observ-
ing,” could intention-observing (as deﬁned above), rather than
intention-reading (as detection of mental states), be a precursor
to language, or at least to conversation? The answer is logically
negative. From a logical and operational point of view, infant can-
not observe any object before operating recursive coordination.
No previous intention-observing is necessary in order to bring
about the developmental structural transformation which allows
a child to converse; on the contrary, it is only by the operational
experience which each individual already has of his domain of lan-
guaging that he can begin to converse. Again, observing neither
precedes nor causes recursive coordination: it does not provide
individuals with the know-how for the coordination, but is rather
a concomitant operational condition for several classes of activities
enacted through languaging. This means that intention-observing
is not a precursor to language; at the same time, we can ascribe
communicative intentions to others while languaging.
CONCLUSION
The principal aim of this paper has been to contribute to studies
in the domain of social cognition and interaction by introducing
some considerations on the constitutive conditions of language.
From an epistemological point of view, I have focused on the
domain of human interaction itself and have shown that human
social interaction, language and sociocultural activities arise from
the same operational-relational matrix.
What I have deﬁned as a “bio-logical” approach challenges
cognitivist accounts of social engagement and coordination. In
opposition to the cognitivist hypothesis proposed by Tomasello
in order to explain language acquisition and joint activity, which
he considers as warranted by a Cartesian infrastructure, I have
suggested that we turn our attention towards the bio-logical
conditions through which the operation of observing arises. As
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previously stated, a generative explanation for human interac-
tional phenomena is needed. This implies, on one hand, the
identiﬁcation of the domain to which we can trace the phenom-
ena to explain (in our case, linguistic activity and sociocultural
practices), and on the other hand, the proposition of a mech-
anism that would allow the occurrence of the phenomena to
explain. Such a domain is that of structural coupling between
living beings, wherein interaction plays a fundamental role. A
bio-logical framework allows us to see the interactional domain
itself as the appropriate domain for explaining human interac-
tivity through the lens of “consensual coordination.” In keeping
with the work of Maturana, the proposed mechanism is that
of recursive consensual coordination, which can be seen as the
organization underlying all linguistic activity, and more generally,
human doings. By the same token, it has been possible to show the
emergence of the operation of observing along with its impli-
cations in human development. Observing, self-consciousness
and mindedness are human forms of existing in the operational-
relational domain, and they therefore cannot be reduced to any
subpersonal infrastructure.
Throughout this paper, I have also summarized the reasons
for avoiding the assumption that, ontogenetically, intention-
reading is a prerequisite for engaging with others in social and
linguistic activities, and have provided arguments precluding such
a characterization. Along with the arguments for a bio-logical
understanding of language and interaction, I have developed argu-
ments against Tomasello’s hypothesis of intention-reading as the
precursor of language. On one hand, I have argued that the
bio-logical understanding of organism allows us to reject both
mentalist explanations and folk-psychological assumptions (see
§2 and §3). On the other hand, I have shown that language is
not a symbolic toolset and cannot not be considered as secondary
to the establishment of joint activities, because it is a constitu-
tive element of each event of recursive coordination (§5 and §7).
Furthermore, the spectatorial stance that is implied by any sort of
intention-reading skills would ultimately require the operation of
observing, which can arise only through languaging and cannot
therefore be its precursor (§6 and §8).
The bio-logical approach has some implications for the study
of social interaction and joint activity. First, it is precisely because
of our ontogenetic trajectory of structural transformation that we,
as individuals developing in languaging, can operate congruently
to what an observer could describe as the properties of our cul-
turally situated system of coordination, and then, recursively and
through reﬂection, elaborate strategies and follow individual or
joint goals congruent to our coordination experience. Second, in
order to explain coordination we cannot trace it to such notions
as communication, cooperation, symbols or intentions which we
use to refer to aspects of the process of coordination itself, and
cannot therefore give rise to it. Rather, it is necessary to reveal the
bio-logical framework within which the phenomena related to the
same notions take place. This is one of the reasons why we cannot
rely on a functionalist conception of language as a tool used for
extra-linguistic transactions, as activities that could occur without
or before languaging; this manner of proceeding confuses the way
we make sense of our doings in languaging with the genesis of lan-
guaging. Third, it is not so much that language has an important
impact on human agency and cultural life, but rather, languaging
is human agency. As said before, the operations that give rise to
recursive coordination are the constitutive, discriminant elements
that conﬁgure a given event of coordination as such. We do not
“use” these elements; rather, we enact them throughout the opera-
tional ﬂow of coordination, although in some cases, by observing
and therefore by constituting them as objects, we can consider that
we are using them to produce a certain effect.
Finally, by recognizing recursive consensual coordination as
an invariant organization of human interactional dynamics, it
becomes possible to understand different classes of phenomena,
from language acquisition to all kind of sociocultural practices, as
resulting from a single process. These phenomena remain to be
studied in detail within their own domains, but the bio-logical
explanation of languaging steers us towards a wider scope of
understanding social interaction, and our speciﬁc mode of “doing
things with others”.
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